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COMMENTS AND CRITICISM 
SENSATIONALIZED PHILOSOPHY: 
A REPLY TO MARQUIS'S "WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL"* 
I N a recent article, Don Marquis' claims to show "Why Abortion 
is Immoral." The title is, as I shall show, much bolder than what 
is warranted by his argument. This essay simply rebuts Mar- 
quis's initial assumption: that the only important question for set- 
tling the abortion issue is the moral status of the fetus, and the 
corroboration for this claim which he alleges to exist in the abortion 
literature. I mean this as only a partial reply,2 and I do not claim to 
add to the positive argument here. In fact, I would not add to the 
thousands of pages written on this topic if I did not feel morally 
compelled to rebut what I see as a sensationalized and erroneous 
treatment of an issue of utmost current political importance. 
In the beginning of his article, Marquis explicitly makes the as- 
sumption that "whether or not abortion is morally permissible stands 
or falls on whether or not a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is 
seriously wrong to end" (183). There are two issues that arise in 
assessing this claim: (1) Is the fetus the sort of thing that could have 
any rights or toward which we could have obligations? (2) Are these 
rights or obligations prima facie or absolute? Marquis's claim seems 
to conflate the two issues, assuming that whatever rights of, or obli- 
gations to, fetuses there are, they must be absolute. 
The assumption that any obligations we have to fetuses are abso- 
lute, presented without argument, is philosophically (and politically) 
irresponsible. It is as if fetuses were things growing out in the gar- 
den, and the question of abortion were whether one may decide to 
till them under rather than let them come to fruition. The question 
of abortion inextricably involves (at least) two lives and a compelling 
bundle of rights on the side of the woman carrying the fetus, what- 
ever we decide about the status of the fetus. Ignoring these rights 
makes about as much sense as considering the issue of the moral 
permissibility of killing adult, fully-conscious humans without con- 
sidering the justification of self-defense. If no countervailing rights 
* I would like to thank Neal Becker, Jack Bricke, Tony Genova, Leslie Jones, and 
JoAnn Reckling for helpful comments. I, alone, am responsible for any remaining 
errors. 
'This JOURNAL, LXXXVI, 4 (April 1989): 183-202. 
2 This is only part of what was originally a longer reply, which is available on 
request from the author. 
0022-362X/90/8705/262-4 ? 1990 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. 
SENSATIONALIZED PHILOSOPHY 263 
or other moral considerations were to be allowed to figure into the 
judgment, the criterion on which Marquis claims that abortion is 
impermissible, having a "future-like-ours," would also rule out kill- 
ing in self-defense. He makes no exceptions to his claim that abor- 
tion is immoral. Thus, it seems that to be consistent he would also 
have to reject any self-defense plea in killing any human being. 
The only justification Marquis provides for the dubious assump- 
tion that a fetus's right to its future is absolute and overriding is an 
appeal to his favorite authors on abortion. He writes: 
Many of the most insightful and careful writers on the ethics of abortion 
. . . believe that whether or not abortion is morally permissible stands 
or falls on whether or not the fetus is the sort of being whose life it is 
seriously wrong to end (183, emphasis mine). 
The list of authors Marquis provides is quite impressive. The claim he 
makes about their arguments here is false, however. They all con- 
sider rights (and other moral concerns) of the pregnant woman, and 
find cases in which her rights or concerns override any consider- 
ations in favor of the fetus.3 The authors cited can be divided into 
two categories: those who argue that abortions are permissible be- 
cause the fetus is not the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong 
to end,4 and those who argue that abortions are impermissible in 
most (but not all) cases because the fetus is such a being.5 
3 Mary Anne Warren, "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion," The Monist, 
LVII, 1(1973): 43-6 1: "The immorality of abortion is no more demonstrated by the 
humanity of the fetus, in itself, than the immorality of killing in self-defense is 
demonstrated by the fact that the assailant is a human being" (p. 46). H. T. Engel- 
hardt, Jr., "The Ontology of Abortion," Ethics, LXXXIV, 3 (1974): 217-234: "The 
rights of the mother regarding abortion are paramount. After all, she is the only 
actual person involved. . . . Consequently, it is to her that one owes overriding 
obligations" (p. 233). Michael Tooley, '4Abortion and Infanticide," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, II, 1 (1972): 37-65. Tooley claims that the argument is settled by the 
fact that the fetus is not a person, and endorses Judith Jarvis Thomson's general 
claims about what would be the case if the fetus were a person, namely, that the 
woman's rights override. Joel Feinberg, "Abortion," in Matters of Life and Death: 
New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy, Tom Regan, ed. (New York: Ran- 
dom, 1986), pp. 256-293: "Even if we grant that the fetus is a moral person and 
thus has a valid claim to life, it does not follow that abortion is always wrong" (p. 
233). J. T. Noonan, Jr., Private Choice (New York: Free Press, 1979). Noonan 
urges the reversal of Roe v. Wade, but on many grounds, including the rights of the 
family and the poor, as well as his view that fetuses are the sorts of beings that it is 
seriously wrong to kill. Philip Devine, The Ethics of Homicide (Ithaca: Cornell, 
1978). Devine allows that there are cases when abortion is not morally impermissi- 
ble, see esp. ch. III. It also seems that one cannot legitimately ignore Thomson, "A 
Defense of Abortion," Philosophy and Public Affairs, I, 1 (1971): 47-66, as being 
among the most insightful writers on abortion. Her view is quite clearly opposed to 
Marquis's; the legal, if not in each case moral, permissibility of abortion stands on 
the rights of women to refuse to donate their bodies to others. 
4 Warren, Engelhardt, Tooley, and Feinberg. 
' Noonan and Devine. 
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With regard to the first group, it is an obvious logical mistake to 
infer from: 
(A) Since the fetus is not the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong 
to end, it is morally permissible to abort. 
that therefore, 
(B) If it were the case that the fetus is the sort of being whose life it is 
seriously wrong to end, then it would be morally impermissible to abort. 
The writers in the first group hold (A), but they make no claims like 
(B). That is, these writers merely claim that the fetus's lack of per- 
sonhood is a sufficient, though not necessary, condition for abortion 
to be morally permissible. Marquis's phrase 'stands or falls' requires 
it to be both a necessary and sufficient condition on the permissibil- 
ity of abortion. 
In the second group, both authors deny (A), but allow that, in 
cases in which the mother's life is in danger, or, perhaps, the woman 
was a victim of rape, abortion is morally permissible, thus denying (B) 
as well. In these cases, they reason, the woman's right to life or her 
serious loss of well-being overrides the rights of the fetus. Thus, they 
regard the woman's rights as a relevant issue in deciding the moral 
permissibility of abortion, and so could hardly be said to argue that 
the moral permissibility of abortion stands or falls with the issue of 
whether it is wrong to kill fetuses. 
Even if we might ultimately agree that the fetus is the sort of thing 
whose killing is so morally wrong as to overwhelm completely a 
woman's rights to privacy, health, medical care, and even life, the 
point surely needs argument. Nothing that has been said in the 
abortion debate to date has come close to settling this issue against 
the woman. So at most Marquis can claim to have shown "Why 
Abortion is Killing a Being-Like-Us." When one recalls that persons 
may legitimately be killed for many reasons, this title has not the same 
moral urgency of Marquis's. 
ANN E. CUDD 
University of Kansas 
DOES A FETUS ALREADY HAVE A FUTURE-LIKE-OURS? 
S ome of the most interesting and underexplored issues in phi- 
k losophy are those of how human beings are in time. A person's 
relationship to her future is very complex, particularly if time 
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